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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Maurice Ronald Troutman appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of rape, claiming his due process rights were
violated as a result of unobjected to statements made by the prosecutor during
her opening statement and closing argument.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas
Heather S. and her friend "Jessi" came to Boise one weekend to watch an
arena football game between the Bakersfield Blitz and the Boise Burn. (Trial Tr.,
p.60, L.2 - p.61, L.9, p.63, Ls.22-25.) Heather frequently traveled to Blitz games
when they were in the area because she was friends with James Durant, one of
the coaches for the Bakersfield team, and was dating Eric Coleman, who was
also a coach for that team. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.5-9, p.64, Ls.8-17, p.156, Ls.3-6.)
Heather and Jessi stayed at the Grove Hotel, where the team and coaches were
also staying. (Trial Tr., p.62, Ls.13-19, p.65, Ls.8-9.) When Heather and Jessi
checked in, they were given two room keys for Room 1020. (Trial Tr., p.65, L.24

- p.66, L.ll.)
At the game on Saturday night, Heather and Jessi had a beer. (Trial Tr.,
p.75, Ls.3-5.) After the game was over, Heather and Jessi returned to their room
to get ready to go out. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.2-5.) However, they were unable to
gain access to their room because Jessi's key, the only key the girls had with
them, was no longer working, and Heather had left her key in the room. (Trial

Tr., p.67, Ls.4-12.) The girls then went down to the front desk where the desk
clerk provided them two new keys. (Trial Tr., p.67, L.6 - p.68, L.2.)
After they returned to their room and got ready, Heather, Jessi, and four of
the coaches, James, Eric, Gary Compton, and Mike Cooper, went out to a local
bar, where Heather had a few more drinks. (Trial Tr., p.69, Ls.9-13, p.71, Ls.1423, p.74, Ls.16-?8.) Steve Baker, a player for the Blitz, also joined them at the
bar. (Trial Tr., p.70, Ls.12-21.) Heather, Jessi, and Steve left the bar sometime
around 1:00 a.m. and returned to the hotel to Heather's and Jessi's room. (Trial
Tr., p.72, L.15 - p.73, L.12, p.169, Ls.9-15.) Jessi and Steve eventually decided
to go back to Steve's room. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.14-19.) After Jessi and Steve
left, Heather took a sleeping pill, Ambien, and went to bed without changing her
clothes. (Trial Tr., p.76, L.9 - p.78, L.24.)
When Jessi and Steve got to Steve's room, there were several people in
there, including a couple having sex.

(Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.1-14.)

Jessi felt

uncomfortable so she and Steve went back to Jessi's room where Jessi changed
clothes.

(Trial Tr., p.172, L.14

-

p.173, L.2.) Jessi and Steve left shortly

thereafter, and Jessi left her room key and license behind. (Trial Tr., p.174, Ls.822.) Jessi and Steve went back to Steve's room where Jessi helped the girl who
had been having sex gather her belongings and go downstairs to catch a cab
because, Jessi explained, the girl "didn't seem altogether." (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.415., p.177, Ls.18-19.) Jessi then returned to Steve's room and spent the night
with him. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.13 - p.179, L.13.)

The next morning, Jessi returned to her room where Heather had to let her
in since Jessi had left her key behind the night before. (Trial Tr., p.80, L.24

-

p.81, L.Z., p.179, Ls.10-18.) At that time, Heather realized something "wasn't
right." (Trial Tr., p.81, L.3 - p.82, L.23.) Heather's pants were off, including her
underwear, and laying on the floor. (Trial Tr., p.81, Ls.9-25.) Her bra was also
off, and her shirt, which tied in the back, was untied. (Trial Tr., p.82, Ls.1-5.)
Heather then started having vague memories of pushing someone's head away
and someone flipping her over and entering her vagina from behind. (Trial Tr.,
p.83, L.16

-

p.85, L.3, p.93, Ls.8-18.)

Heather called Eric and told him

something happened and "something was definitely not right." (Trial Tr., p.85,
Ls.12-15.) Heather told Eric she thought she had sex the night before but was
not sure if it was "consensual," and could not clearly remember what happened
after she took her Ambien. (Trial Tr., p.256, Ls.7-12, 16-23.) Heather did not call
law enforcement at that time.
At some point, Heather also realized some of her things were missing,
including her iPod, her iPod alarm, her camera, and $70.00 cash from her purse.
(Trial Tr., p.86, L.18

- p.88, L.lO.)

One of the room keys was also missing.

(TrialTr., p.106, L.18-p.107, 1.1.)
Jessi called Eric and told him about the apparent theft, at which time Eric
went down to the front desk to tell them "some things" had been stolen from
Heather's room. (Trial Tr., p.257, Ls.3-12, p.257, Ls.13-21.) Eric did not report a
possible sexual assault because Heather was "so unsure of what had
happened." (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.15-18.)

After law enforcement arrived at the Grove, Troutman approached Officer
Cody Evans, who was in the hotel lobby, and told him "[a] little birdie in the tree"
told him Heather had given someone her key to "come in to . . . hang out with
her." (Trial Tr., p.329, L.25 - p.332, L.19; Exhibit 16A, p.1, Ls.8-9.) Troutman
then asked Officer Evans if Heather was "missing something." (Exhibit 16A, p.2,
Ls.14-15.) Officer Evans told Troutman Heather was missing an iPod and a
camera. (Exhibit 16A, p.2, L.19.) Officer Evans also told Troutman Heather
thought she had been raped, to which Troutman responded, "Fuck no." (Exhibit
16A, p.3, Ls.5-7.) Officer Evans then told Troutman Heather's belongings had
been returned to the front desk.

(Exhibit 16A, p.3, Ls.15-16.)

Troutman

explained that was "because the word got out that it, something happened."
(Exhibit 16A, p.3, Ls.17-19; see also Exhibit 17A, p.1, Ls.20-25.) Troutman
elaborated on this later, telling Detective Matt Brechwald he "put the word out" to
other players that if any of them stole Heather's property, they could return it
outside his door and he would turn it in for them. (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.7-12.)
According to Troutman's initial statements, he purposely lefi his room to allow
this to happen and returned to find a white bag leaning against his door with the
stolen property inside. (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.13-17.) Troutman then returned the
bag to the front desk.' (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.17-19.)

' James Dennis, the front desk supervisor at the Grove Hotel testified that an
African-American male brought a bag to the front desk and told him the "coach"
would pick it up. (Trial Tr., p.319, L.12 - p.320, L.2.) Sometime later, Mr. Dennis
received a call from an unidentified male who told him the items turned in were
for Room 1020. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.24 - p.322, L.1.)

After explaining his involvement with the stolen property, Troutman told
Detective Brechwald he heard Heather said she was raped, and he wanted to
"clear himself." (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.20-25.) Troutman admitted he had sex with
Heather after "the friend" allegedly gave him Heather's room key and told him to
go "holler at her."

(Exhibit 22A, p.12, Ls.8-11; Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.1-23.)

Troutman took the key, let himself inio Heather's room, where she was sleeping,
laid down next to her and "started cuddling with her." (Exhibit 22A, p.12, Ls.1113; Trial Tr., p.455, L.24 - p.456, L.lO.) Troutman said she mumbled something
incoherent at one point but they never had any conversation. (Trial Tr., p.456,
Ls.10-12.) Troutman specifically admitted penetrating Heather from behind.
(Trial Tr., p.458, Ls.12-16.)
Troutman also admitted giving the key to Heather's room to another
player, later identified as Rennard Reynolds, after he left and telling Reynolds he
just had sex in there and Reynolds could probably get "laid" too. (Trial Tr. p.456,
Ls.16-20.) According to Troutman, he thought Heather was one of those girls
who likes to have sex with multiple football players. (Trial Tr., p.456, L.21

-

p.457, L.2.) When the police confronted Troutman with information they heard
from Reynolds that Troutman said he told Heather it was just a "dream,"
Troutman claimed he only told Reynolds that to find "how much of a big mouth
[Reynolds] was." (Exhibit 22A, p.44, L . l l - p.5, L.23.)
With respect to the items stolen from Heather's room, Troutman admitted
"grabb[ing] some stuff thinking it was [his] stuff," but said he "gave it back as
soon as [he] found out it wasn't [his]." (Exhibit 22A, p.19, Ls.13-19.) Although

Troutman did not identify what in particular he "grabbed," Leo Sullivan, a fellow
player and Troutman's roommate on the trip, testified that Troutman told him he
got a camera from "some girl." (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.8-22.)
Further investigation by law enforcement revealed there were a total of
four unauthorized entries into Heather's room. (Exhibit 28;

see generally Trial Tr.

and Grand Jury Tr.)
Heather underwent a sexual assault exam at which time swabs were
taken of her face, breasts, rectum, and genitals for purposes of DNA testing.
(Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.21-25, p.386, L.3 - p.387, L.1, p.388, Ls.2-18, p.395, Ls.6-18.)
Rylene Nowlin, an expert in DNA comparison analysis, conducted DNA testing
on the swabs taken from Heather and compared those results with the results of
DNA testing on swabs taken from Troutman and ~ e ~ n o l d s . (Trial
'
Tr., p.503,
Ls.18-22, p.510, L.22

- p.518,

L.18.) As a result of this testing, Ms. Nowlin

determined that Heather and Troutman were both "potential contributors" to the
DNA found on Heather's vaginal swabs to the exclusion of "99.99 per cent of
randomly-selected individuals." (Trial Tr., p.512, Ls.9-17.) Troutman was also
the "source of semen" on the perineal swabs taken from Heather. (Trial Tr.,
p.514, Ls.20-21.) Ms. Nowlin also identified Reynolds as a potential contributor
to the DNA evidence on the saliva swabs taken from Heather's face, and could

Ms. Nowlin also compared Heather's swabs with swabs taken from Eric
Coleman, Mike Cooper, and Steve Baker, all of whom were excluded as possible
contributors to the DNA evidence found on Heather's swabs. (Trial Tr., p.513,
Ls.12-15, p.518, Ls.12-18.)

not eliminate Troutman as an additional source. (Trial Tr., p.516, L.10 - p.518,
L.16.)
Troutman was indicted for rape.3

(R., pp.11-12.)

The indictment

specifically alleged Troutman committed the crime of rape by "penetrat[ingj the
vaginal opening of Heather S., . . ., with his penis, and where Heather S. was
unconscious of the nature of the act at the time," or "was unable l o resist due to
any intoxicating or narcotic substance." (R. p.12.) Troutman's case proceeded
to trial, and a jury convicted him of rape. (R., p.64.) The court imposed a unified
twenty-year sentence with five years fixed.

(R., p.73.)

Troutman timely

appealed. (R., pp.75-77.)

The state also sought an indictment against Troutman for burglary based on his
entry into Heather's room with the intent to commit rape, or in the alternative, with
the intent to commit theft. (R., p.12.) The grand jury did not find probable cause
to support this charge. (R., p.12.)

Troutman states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct depriving Mr. Troutman of
due process of law and a fair trial, such that he is now entitled to a
new trial?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Troutman failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in relation to
the prosecutor's opening statement or closing arguments?

ARGUMENT
Troutman Has Failed To Establish Error. Much Less Fundamental Error. In
Relation To Any Of The Prosecutor's Comments Durinq Her Opening Statement
Or Closina Arauments
A.

Introduction
Troutman argues that the prosecutor made several comments during her

opening statement and closing arguments, which he did not object to, that
prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-26.) Troutman has
failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to
establish error, much less fundamental error, in relation to any of the prosecutor's
statements.
B.

Standard Of Review And General Leaal Standards Governinq Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. RomeroGarcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[llt is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwriaht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent."

Id. at

181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly

overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's
ability to judge the evidence fairly."

Id. at

11-12. Consistent with Darden and

m,the ldaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to
result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d
1170, 1181 (1999).
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an

ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from
the plethora of less damaging interpretations.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 ldaho 423,427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33
(1986)). The ldaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[tlhe right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
C.

Fundamental Error
Absent a timely objection at trial, an appellate court will generally not

consider an issue on appeal unless the error alleged is "fundamental error."
State v. McAway, 127 ldaho 54, 896 P.2d 962 (1995). An error is fundamental if
it "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State v.
Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). An error is not
deemed fundamental and may not be reviewed for the first time on appeal if it

could have been cured by a timely objection. State v. Brown, $31 ldaho 61, 6871, 951 P.2d 1288, 1295-98 (Ct. App. 1998).

In the context of closing

arguments, the ldaho Supreme Court has stated:
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence. More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded.
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations,
quotations, and brackets omitted).
The same standard of fundamental error is applied to claims of
prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements. State v. Dunn, 134 ldaho
165, 171, 997 P.2d 626, 632 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 13,
909 P.2d 624,631 (Ct. App. 1995).
Application of the foregoing standards to Troutman's claims of
prosecutorial misconduct reveals he has failed to establish error, much less
fundamental error,
D.

None Of The Prosecutor's Statements Troutman Complains Of Were
Improper. Much Less So E~renious Or Inflammatow That Anv
Consequent Preiudice Could Not Have Been Cured Bv A Curative
Instruction
Troutman claims the prosecutor engaged in "numerous instances of

misconduct during her opening statements and closing arguments" that "are so

egregious as to constituted [sic] fundamental, reversible error."

(Appellant's

Brief, p.8.) All of Troutman's misconduct claims lack merit.
1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Ask The Jurv To Draw Inferences She
Knew To Be False Nor Did She Araue Inconsistent Theories

In discussing the state's burden of proof and the evidence presented at
trial of the multiple unauthorized entries into Heather's room, the prosecutor
advised the jury that her burden to establish the elements of rape did not require
her to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, what happened during each of those
different entries, explaining:
I only have to prove to you one time, and we know that that
one time did take place. There is a period of time between the time
he enters the room until that room is entered again.
Defendant tells us that he passed the key to another man,
because he figured it's just a matter of figuring that this woman in
there that he doesn't know and has never met before and has
never talked to is up to having sex with multiple members of the
football team.
He also tells us that he went to his own room -- Leo told us
that. He came to the room and talked about getting a camera from
a girl. Leo didn't talk about a time frame, but it would have to
logically be after the time he has entered the room, has taken her
camera and left again.
And you know that it's her camera by the way that he is
talking about it, because he ends up returning it when the jig is up,
and the police are on the scene, and they are investigating.
He panics and is trying to return everything and get all the
evidence and the camera from himself. So the camera, he talks
about he told the police about, has to be the same camera. I don't
have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but it's a pretty good
probability.
At 4:53 a.m. we know that room has been entered a second
time. I don't have to prove if there was a rape or theft there,
because the victim is unconscious. She is unaware these multiple

entries are happening. She doesn't know who is coming into the
room, to tell us again at 5:09 a.m., 16 minutes later, the room is
entered again.
The same key card the defendant had in his possession.
That key card never went back to Jessi and was never placed back
into the room, so he had it, and he says he handed it off to a third
party unknown to the victim. Okay?
So either he or someone that he designated, by passing it
along, is going into that room again. And that happens, a second
entry happens. Again, don't know if there is rape or theft
happening again.
0 2 9 ~ again
~ ' ~is~used one hour later. There is a fourth
entry. Again, do not know what other crimes were committed
against this woman during that time frame. We do know at some
point the iPOD was taken from the room. Her other luggage was
searched. The wires that go with it are taken out of the room as
well, and again, I don't know -- that's a side issue. I don't know if
Mr. Troutman did that beyond a reasonable doubt or if his buddy
that he passed the card to did that, but I do know that Mr. Troutman
returned it all to the front desk when he knew the police was [sic] on
them, and he would be getting caught.
All of that, mere inability to know who's in there, how many
times he is coming in, she is not aroused. She is not awakened.
She does not know, and she does not even realize a theft has
happened, because she is that unaware and sedated and
unconscious and helpless.5
And their repetitive entering into the room obviously speaks
squarely to the point of her ability to be able to appreciate the
nature of the act, which is the penetration in this case.
(Trial Tr., p.641, L.3 - p.643, L.lO.)
Setting aside the clear import of the prosecutor's argument that evidence
of multiple entries into Heather's room by Troutman and Reynolds of which she
029CD refers the code assigned to the room key used to enter Heather's room.
(Exhibit 28; Trial Tr., pp.425-430.)
Troutman omits this paragraph of the prosecutor's closing argument from his
excerpt, without indication of the omission. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

was unaware indicated her inability to consent, Troutrnan argues that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making this argument because, he
complains, the argument "implied" that (1) Troutman "must have known that
[Heather] was incapacitated because he may have snuck back into her hotel
room one or more times after having sex with her," and (2) Troutman "is simply a
bad man, a criminal, who may have raped and stolen from [Heather] multiple
times." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) According to Troutman, these implications were
"extremely dishonest" because the prosecutor:
knew very well that Mr. Reynolds had entered [Heather's] room
three separate times; she knew that Mr. Troutman certainly could
not have raped Ms. Schiliereff multiple times; and she knew that
Mr. Reynolds was the one who had taken the iPod and its charger,
and had rooted around for additional items to steal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-I I.)
Troutman supports his argument by referencing testimony from the grand
jury proceedings by Officer Mark Vucinich regarding Reynolds' admissions.
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

Specifically, Officer Vucinich testified that Reynolds

admitted he went into Heather's room after Troutman gave him the key and told
him he could go in there and have sex, and admitted he stole Heather's iPod
"and some miscellaneous fixtures that go with it," and returned to her room two
more times

-

once to look for "more items for the iPod," and once for no

particular reason. (Grand Jury Tr., p.161, L.12 - p.172, L.15.)
Exactly why Troutman believes the grand jury testimony cited
demonstrates knowledge on the part of the prosecutor that Troutman never reentered Heather's room is unclear. That Reynolds admitted he made multiple

entries into Heather's room and stole Heather's iPod and charger is certainly not
mutually exclusive of the possibility that Troutman also re-entered Heather's
room with Reynolds at some point. The same grand jury testimony Troutman
relies on indicates Reynolds saw the camera the first time he went in Heather's
room but did not take it. (Grand Jury Tr., p.167, Ls.14-21.) Since Troutman
admitted "grabbing" some stuff, and told Leo Sullivan he got a camera from a
"girl," it is not beyond reason that Troutman could have returned with Reynolds
on his third or fourth trip into Heather's room. This possibility is supported by Mr.
Sullivan's additional testimony that he overheard Reynolds and Troutman in his
room at some point after Troutman told him he had gotten the camera. (Trail Tr.,
p.226, L.6

- p.227, L.23.)

The conversation between Troutman and Reynolds

also included references to sexual contact with a girl. (Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.21-23.)
It would be not be unreasonable to infer from this information that Troutman and
Reynolds may have gotten back together after Troutman gave the key to
Reynolds and before going back to Reynolds' and Sullivan's room, and Troutman
has cited nothing in the record to establish that the prosecutor knew this was
false.
Troutman's reliance on Nguyen V. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236 (gthCir. 2000),
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (gth Cir. 1997), reversed on other
grounds, and State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 248-49, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072-73
(2008), to support his claim of misconduct is misplaced. In Thompson, the Ninth
Circuit held '?hat when no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor
cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent

theories and facts regarding the same crime." 120 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis
added). Similarly, in Nauven, the Ninth Circuit held "that a prosecutor's pursuit of
fundamentally inconsistent theories in separate trials against separate
defendants charged with the same murder can violate due process if the
prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence or acts in bad faith." 232 F.3d at 1240
(emphasis added).

However, the court in Nsuyen also noted that a mere

difference in the evidence presented at separate trials involving co-defendants is
not sufficient to establish a due process violation, particularly where there is no
evidence of falsification or bad faith, and the theories presented in each case are
consistent.

id.

In Pearce, the ldaho Supreme Court, after discussing Thompson and
Nguven, stated:
While a prosecutor, as the agent of the people and the state,
has the unique duty to ensure a fundamentally fair trial by seeking
not only to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer
justice, courts have largely recognized the limits of punishing
prosecutors for apparent inconsistencies in their approach to
criminal trials absent a "core" inconsistency.
146 Idaho at -,

192 P.3d at 1073 (citations omitted).

There is absolutely no evidence that the prosecutor in this case pursued
inconsistent theories against Troutman and Reynolds at separate trials involving
the same crime. Indeed, the state did not charge Troutman and Reynolds with
the same offense (R., pp.10-12), and Reynolds never went to trial (Appendix A

-

Register of Actions from State v. Reynolds). Therefore, the principles articulated
in Thompson, Nguven, and Pearce do not apply.

Even if this Court were to apply the principles articulated in Thompson,
Nquven, and Pearce to differences in the evidence presented at the grand jury
and the evidence presented at trial, ignoring the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgement
in Nguven that "trial preparation is not a static process," 232 F.3d at 1240, and
ignoring that Troutman and Reynolds were not even charged with the same
crime, Troutman has failed to establish an insonsistency in the "theory"
presented to the grand jury and the "theory" presented at Troutman's trial simply
because the prosecutor, in her closing argument, did not advise the jury that
there was evidence that Reynolds admitted stealing the iPod.

Indeed, the

prosecutor could not have done so because Reynolds' admissions were not
introduced at Troutman's trial, and the prosecutor did not act in bad faith by
failing to introduce such evidence, particularly since, as the prosecutor pointed
out, who stole what and when was ultimately irrelevant to whether Troutman
raped Heather.
Setting aside Troutman's reliance on the grand jury testimony regarding
Reynolds' involvement in the thefts and his erroneous assertion that the state's
position before the grand jury was inconsistent with its theory at trial, Troutman's
belief that the prosecutor's comments "implied" Troutman is "simply a bad man,"
does not make them improper. Presumably most closing arguments following a
rape trial could be read to imply the defendant is a bad man - that does not
mean such arguments are misconduct. To the extent Troutman is arguing that
the prosecutor's comments were improper because they urged the jury to convict
him, not on the evidence, but because he was a bad man generally, such an

argument is clearly belied by the record. As previously noted, the prosecutor's
comments regarding the multiple entries into Heather's room were made in the
context of discussing the state's burden of proof and what the burden applied to,
and not for the purpose of implying Troutman was a "bad man."
Troutman's argument that the prosecutor's comments may have also
implied that Troutman "must have known that [Heather] was incapacitated
because he may have snuck back into her hotel room one or more times after
having sex with her," misstates the prosecutor's argument.

The evidence

presented at trial established that there were multiple entries into Heather's room
without her knowledge. It was perfectly acceptable for the prosecutor to highlight
this information in closing argument, as she did, and argue that evidence of
multiple entries unknown to Heather demonstrated that Heather was
unconscious of what was going on or was incapable of consenting to or resisting
sexual intercourse.
Troutman's argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
discussing the multiple entries into Heather's room, her references to the items
taken, including the iPod, and her statement that she was unsure what, if any,
other crimes may have occurred during those multiple unauthorized entries was
a violation of I.R.E. 404(b), is equally unmeritorious. Evidence of the four entries,
the items that were stolen, and the DNA evidence were all introduced at trial
without objection. To suggest, as Troutman does, that the prosecutor could not
discuss this evidence in closing argument and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom or discuss this evidence in relation to the state's burden of proof

is contrary to law.

See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969

(2003) (the parties "are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints,
the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation omitted)
2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Distort Troutman's Defense

Troutman's closing argument centered around the theory that Troutman
had sex with Heather with her consent, and the jury could conclude she
consented because she told Eric she was not sure if it was consensual and
because prior to taking her Ambien and going to sleep she was "behaving in a
way that is appearing normal to other people, and yet she doesn't remember it,"
and sending text messages, which, the defense argued requires "coordination"
and "fine motor control."

(See senerallv Trial Tr., pp.657-663.) The defense

further argued that because Heather does not know whether the sex was
consensual, nobody knows. (Trial Tr., p.663, L.18

- p.664, L.19.)

In addition,

the defense characterized the "camera" as a "red herring," arguing, "There is no
excuse for stealing a camera. I'm not going to pretend there is. But this isn't a
theft case. This is a rape case. And stealing a camera does not get you to
rape." (Trial Tr., p.663, Ls.9-13.)
In rebuttal, the state argued, infer alia:
[H]e would have a done deal if, based on this argument, we are all
going to have to put heavy locks on our doors, on the windows in
our house and wear chastity belts when we go to bed, because in
case you are lawfully ingesting any substance that makes you
unable to fend for yourself and the next day you can't remember
much about what's happened, but the law enforcement has done
their absolute best and has figured out the criminal involved and the
crime that's committed, you are at fault, and there is no crime.

Under this suggestion, if your house door is unlocked and a
person walking by decides that they are going to check all the
doors in the neighborhood in the middle of the night and see who's
got something they can take, comes into your house, and you
happen to have taken a sleeping pill, or whatever, or are just a
really heavy sleeper and someone comes through your house,
takes everything you have and goes, "Hey, buddy, I'm taking your
car," and you don't wake up, and he leaves.
When he is caught later, he is going to go, "I was in his
house. It was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't come in."
And then I said to him "Dude, I'm taking your car, and he
doesn't remember, and he did not follow the warnings on the
Ambien he was taking that said don't mix it with alcohol, that's his
fault."
When you start shifting the blame in a case like this onto the
victim for her inability to remember every detail of what she was
doing behind her locked door, in her own bedroom, in her own bed,
then you are turning the world upside down. Justice not in its real
sense, but what conceptual sense is.
(Trial Tr., p.665, L.3 - p.666, L.15.)
On appeal, Troutman complains the foregoing argument made by the
prosecutor during rebuttal "grossly misstated and distorted what Mr. Troutman's
defense actually was," "exhorted the jurors to convict Mr. Troutman based on a
desire to cure a greater societal problem andlor protect themselves from others,"
and sought to reduce the state's burden of proof. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) All of
Troutman's claims fail
First, Troutman's argument that the prosecutor characterized his "defense
as being one of 'I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I took that as a 'yes"' (Appellant's
Brief., p.6), is false. Nowhere in the argument cited by Troutman, and excerpted
above, did the prosecutor characterize the defense in this manner. Nor did the
prosecutor's use of the word "blame" improperly characterize Troutman's

defense.

Rather, the prosecutor simply urged the jury to reject Troutman's

argument that the jury could not find him guilty because Heather could not
remember whether the sex was consensual. This was not improper.
Second, contrary to Troutman's argument, the prosecutor did not "ask[ ]
the jury to convict Mr. Troutman to alleviate societal problems that are much
larger than

Mr. Troutman's own case, and out of fear for themselves, their

families, and, in fact, anyone else who might become a victim of a home
invasion." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) The prosecutor was not, as Troutman
suggests, urging the jury to convict Troutman to "alleviate" a "societal problem[]"6

- she was

using an analogy in response to describe the practical effect of the

defense's theory of the case. This is not improper.
Third, Troutman's argument that the state "subtly sought to relax the
State's burden of proof' is absurd.

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

According to

Troutman, the state accomplished this "subtle" relaxation of its burden "by
arguing that, just because the State's key witness could not testify as to whether
a crime had committed [sic] and, if so, by whom, the jury should nevertheless
convict Mr. Troutman because 'the law enforcement has done their absolute best
and has figured out the criminal involved and the crime that's committed."'
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20 (quoting Trial Tr., p.665, Ls.3-14))

This comment

was not, as Troutman argues, a request for the jury to presume guilt "based on
the mere fact that Mr. Troutman was believed to be guilty by the police"

Indeed, the state is unaware of what "societal problem" Troutman thinks the
prosecutor was trying to alleviate. As far as the state knows, people taking
Ambien, with or without alcohol, are not regularly the victims of home invasions.

(Appellant's Brief, p.20), it was an assertion that the jury was not required to
acquit Troutman simply because Heather could not "remember much about
what[] happened" (Trial Tr., p.665, L.lO). Troutman's efforts to spin it as anything
other than that do not withstand scrutiny.
3.

The Prosecutor Did Not lmwroperlv "Attemptll To Engender
Svmpathv" For Heather "And/or Derision" For Troutman

Troutman complains "the prosecutor's arguments in this case were replete
with attempts to engender sympathy for [Heather]." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.)
Specifically, Troutman argues it was improper for the prosecutor, in her opening
statement, to "highlight" Heather's "suffering during the rape exam," and in
closing arguments to refer to Heather as a "poor woman" and a "real person" who
came to Boise to have a "very nice time" and instead had a "very traumatic
situation happen to her." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) These characterizations
of Heather and her experience hardly constitute misconduct, particularly where,
as here, they were not the focus of the state's opening statement or closing
argument, and were not the basis upon which the prosecutor urged the jury to
convict Troutman. Even if it was improper to refer to Heather as a "real person"
or "poor woman," or to refer to her "suffering" through the sexual assault exam,
given that Heather testified about her experience of being sexually assaulted and
having to undergo what was certainly an unpleasant examination, which included
pictures, take "medication pills for STDs and pregnancy," and AIDS testing (Trial
Tr., p.97, Ls.16-23), it is unlikely the prosecutor's characterizations of Heather
and her experience further influenced the jury to convict Troutman.

See State v.

m,122 ldaho 809, 819, 839 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that
although it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the victim of rape what had
"been the hardest part of the whole thing" for her, because the victim "had just
testified she had been abducted, choked, beaten, raped, and threatened with the
loss of her life and the lives of her children," the court did "not see how a
subsequent question implying that these events had been 'hard' for her could
further influence the jury").
Troutman's claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by trying "to
generate resentment" toward him by noting he did not wear a condom also lacks
merit. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22.) Troutman, by his own admission, and as
evidenced by the DNA analysis, did not wear a condom. (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.1924, p.512, Ls.9-17.) As a result, Heather testified she had to take "medication
pills for STDs and pregnancy," and AIDS testing. (Trial Tr., p.97, Ls.16-23.) It
was not improper for the prosecutor to refer to this evidence during closing
argument.

See

Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969 (the parties "are

entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation omitted).

It was evidence of

Troutman's conduct that made him look like a "bad man," not the prosecutor's
argument.
4.

The Prosecutor Did Not Testify

Troutman claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by stating, in
response to Troutman's statement to Detective Brechwald that he thought
Heather was just one of those girls who likes to have sex with multiple football

players, "Even women who -- and I am yet to hear from a single woman who has
done that - this is anecdotal from him --that there are women who have sex with
multiple members at one time, willingly have sex with multiple members at one
time . . .." (Appellant's Brief, p.23 (quoting Trial Tr., p.652, Ls.2-7.) According to
Troutman, such argument was improper because it amounted to testimony by the
prosecutor regarding "new evidence . . . that she has never personally heard of a
woman wanting to have sex with multiple partners." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.)
This is an overbroad characterization of the prosecutor's statement. She did not
say she had never, in her own personal experience, heard of a woman engaging
in such behavior. She said that she had "yet to hear from a single woman who
has done that"

- a comment that

could very well be referring to the evidence

introduced at trial, or the lack thereof.
Even if the prosecutor's statement could be characterized as improper
"testimony" regarding facts not in evidence, Troutman has failed to explain why
the statement was so egregious or inflammatory that it could not have been
cured by an objection such that the statement must be deemed fundamental
error.
5.

The Prosecutor Did Not Ask The Juw To Presume Rape "In An
Effort To Chanae Existins 'Lenient' Cultural Views Reaardina Sex"

Troutman's final claim of prosecutorial misconduct is based on the
following argument:
He wants to finagle his way around the sexual issues. And I
don't know what it is about our culture, generally not American, but
all male-female relationships, where we give more importance to
someone taking a tangible thing from us without our permission, but

we are more lenient about the issue of someone having sexual
penetration.
Maybe he could have been misled or misunderstood. We
don't say maybe he misunderstood that he could take a camera.
He didn't ask her about taking that, either.
We are very clear on that issue, that you took the camera,
didn't ask permission, and that's not okay. But with the sex, we are
willing to sort of go into the realm of unreasonable, unfortunately.
(Trial Tr., p.656, Ls.8-24.)
Troutman argues this was improper argument because, he claims, "it
could have been taken one (or both) of two ways:" (1) it could have been viewed
by the jury as permission to "presume rape from the fact that Mr. Troutman had
sex with [Heather] without specific permission" just as they could "presume theft
from the fact that Mr. Troutman took [Heather's] camera without explicit
permission," andlor (2) the jury should "apply a more pro-prosecution standard to
their deliberations because cultural views on non-consensual sex have
traditionally been too lax."

(Appellant's Brief, p.25.)

Both of Troutman's

interpretations strain reason.
Nowhere in her argument did the prosecutor ask the jury to presume
Troutman raped Heather, much less ask them to presume he did so based on
the presumption that he stole her camera. This is an absurd reading of the
prosecutor's argument, as is Troutman's claim that the argument could be
interpreted as urging the jury to be "more pro-prosecution" to compensate for
"lax" "cultural views on non-consensual sex."

The foregoing argument

immediately followed a discussion of Troutman's theft of the camera and his
initial denials that he took the camera:

The detective asked him in seven different ways [whether he
took the camera]. Defendant's response is "no" seven different
times, because they asked him. Of course, [Officer] Vucinich even
tried to make it sound less accusatory, "Did the camera follow you
through, out the door," make it sound a little less problematic, so
they may say, "Oh, yes it may have."
He can't do it. Why do you think that is? Because that's a
tangible object. It's one thing to do try [sic] to bamboozle people
and say, "Oh, she was totally into it. She just can't remember. She
liked it. She was into it. She was fine. She was awake," because
that isn't something tangible.
We cannot see that far into them. We can't open up
Heather's brain to see what was going on in there. But a camera
that left the room while a girl was sleeping, that is called taking
people's things without their permission.
And he can't admit to that, because it's a very concrete,
obviously, bad act on his part that he did to this person, to a person
that he is claiming is awake and is fully aware of what's going on.
When he is pushed to the brink -- because they are saying,
"Look, why should I believe you about the rape? Why you can't
admit to the simple fact that you took this girl's camera without
permission," he again says, "I was tipsy. I grabbed some stuff. I'm
not going to see what -- I grabbed some stuff thinking it was mine,
and as soon as I found it wasn't, I gave it back -- gave it to back to
the victim."
Of course, that is not at all the case. He did not think his
camera was inside her purse. He just does not know how to deny
the undeniable.
(Trial Tr., p.654, L.21 - p.656, L.7.)
If it was not apparent from the portion of the argument cited by Troutman,
it is certainly apparent when the entire argument is read in context that the
prosecutor was not urging the jury to presume anything or to be more
sympathetic to the prosecution based on "cultural norms."

Rather, she was

highlighting that there is no distinction between taking a piece of property without

someone's permission and taking something more personal and intimate without
their permission. This is not improper.
Troutman's additional claims that the prosecutor's argument was improper
because it "misled the jury" by allegedly implying "that Mr. Troutman had been
found guilty of theft when, in actuality he had never even been charged with . . .
such an offense" and "implied that the accidental taking of someone else's
property constitutes theft under Idaho law" are ridiculous. (Appellant's Brief,
p.25.) The prosecutor in no way indicated Troutman had been found guilty of
theft, and her comments that he took the camera were consistent with the
evidence of Troutman's admission that he did so.
6.

Troutman Has Failed To Establish Anv Error. Much Less
Fundamental Error

Troutman "concedes that none of the instances of misconduct complained
of above were objected to by his attorney at trial," but argues he is nevertheless
entitled to relief under the fundamental error doctrine. (Appellant's Brief, p.27.)
Although Troutman cites the correct standard for fundamental error, he fails to
apply that standard to his claims. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Instead, he only
asserts "that the instances of misconduct described . . . above, whether
considered individually, or in the aggregate, constitute fundamental error
because so much of it was calculated inflame [sic] the passions and prejudices of
the jury and influence the verdict with matters outside the evidence." (Appellant's
Brief, p.28.)

However, the fundamental error standard requires Troutman to

explain why the comments complained of were so egregious or inflammatory that

they could not have been cured by an instruction. Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280,
77 P.3d at 969. Because Troutman has failed to present any argument on this
point, this Court should decline to consider his arguments. State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.").
Even if this Court considers Troutman's claim of furidamental error,
because he has failed to establish any error, he has necessarily failed to
establish fundamental error. Even if some of the prosecutor's arguments were
improper, Troutman has failed to articulate any basis for concluding the
arguments were so egregious or inflammatory that "any consequent prejudice
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d
at 969.
CONCLUSION
The state respeclfully requests that this Court affirm Troutman's
conviction.
DATED this 5thday of February, 2009.
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07/10/2007 Video Arraignment - 07/10/2007
07/10/2007 Charge number I : Charge Booked by ACSO
07/10/2007 Video Arraignment Video Arraignment - 07/10/2007
07/10/2007 Charge number I:Charge Filed Cause Found
07/10/2007 Video Arraignment
i
i
07/10/2007 Order Appointing Public Defender
I
07/10/2007 Charge number 1: Bond Reduced or Amended to - $150000.00
07/10/2007 Event Scheduled Preliminary Hearing - 07/31/2007
07/12/2007 Notice - of Hearing
i
I
07/12/2007 Motion -for Bond Reduction
07/12/2007 Defendant Request For Discovery
07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Defendant Bound Over - H0700971 0.02
07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Count Indicted To - H0700971 D.02 C.002
07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Bond Transferred To - H0700971 D.02 C.002
i
07/25/2007 INDICTMENT FILED
I
I
07/25/2007 Ref H0700971 and GO700069
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Connection: Secure

